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STRANGERS AND BROTHERS:
A HOMILY ON TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION··
CARL E. SCHNEIDER•

And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying,
Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? He said unto him, What
is written in the law? ... And he answering said, Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy
strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. And he
said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live.
But he . .. said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?

Luke 10:25-29
INTRODUCTION: A PARABLE AND A HISTORY

The common law speaks to us in parables. Ours is Drummond v.
1
Fulton County Department of Family and Children's Services. Just
before Christmas 1973, a boy named Timmy was born to a white
mother and a black father. A month later, his mother was declared
unfit, and the Department of Family and Children Services placed
Timmy with white foster parents - Robert and Mildred Drummond.
The Drummonds were "excellent" and "loving" parents, and Timmy
grew into "an extremely bright, highly verbal, outgoing 15-month baby
boy."
Then the Drummonds asked to adopt Timmy. The Department's
reviews of the Drummonds' devotion to Timmy remained enthusiastic,

•• This article was delivered at the John FitzRandolph Lecture at the Whittier Law
School on September I 0, 2002. The published version is taken directly from the text
of the lecture as it was delivered. Hence the Review has not had an opportunity to edit
the text and should not be held responsible for errors or infelicities. They are mine
alone. For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U
Chicago L Rev 1343 (1986), I follow the University of Chicago Manual of Legal
Citation (Lawyers Co-operative, 1989).
'Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law & Professor of Internal Medicine, University
of Michigan. I am grateful for the helpful of my research assistants, Sara K. Orr and
Lance Rich. And I am glad to thank Kim Forde-Mazrui, Marsha Garrison, and Suellyn
Scarnecchia for their perceptive, learned, and wise comments on an earlier draft of this
lecture.
l. 563 F2d 1200 (1977, 5th Circuit en bane).
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if condescending, but the Department told the Drummonds that
Timmy needed a black family. The Drummonds "'stated they could let
Timothy go to a young, energetic, religious, adoptive couple. They
expressed primary concern that he not be moved from their home to
another foster home .... They feel that separation from Timothy will
tear their hearts out but that they can do it because it would be best for
3
Timothy in the long run.'" In August 1975, a Department evaluation
concluded that the Drummonds had given Timmy "'excellent care"'
and had "'accepted a mixed race child and ... handled the attendant
problems well.'" In September, a court terminated Timmy's parents'
rights and freed him for adoption. The Drummonds said they would
"'do anything we [the social workers] suggested to go through a series
of intensive interviews with black caseworker [sic] to help them
understand the black culture and heritage, to read books and other
literature in order to educate themselves in the black experience, and to
talk with their own black friends at work about their feelings and
4
experiences about being black."' The social workers acknowledged
that "'[t]he fact that there presently are no appropriate homes for
Timmy, and the fact that he might also experience some rejection by
some members of the black community due to his 'whiteness' is [sic]
also a consideration."' 5 In November 1975, when Timmy was almost
two years old, the Department told the Drummonds "that Timmy will
be better off adopted by a black couple." 6
The Drummonds sued to be allowed to adopt, and after their
odyssey through the Georgia and federal courts, the Fifth Circuit en
bane (on November 28, 1977, when Timmy was almost four) held
against the Drummonds, since "'the difficulties inherent in interracial
adoption' justify the consideration of 'race as a relevant factor .... "'7
Timmy Drummond is emblematic of no small number of children
adoption agencies have thought should be adopted only by a black
couple. Historically, agencies generally prevented parents from
adopting interracially. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the racial
climate shifted and minority children's need for homes was pressing.
By the middle to late 1960s, "transracial adoption seemed to be the 'in'
thing for progressive agencies." 8 However, there was soon a
2. "Because the Drummonds are not from the kind of upper-middle class
achievement oriented home most caseworkers come from it does make it hard to
visualize seeing Timmy grow up 'successfully' in this kind of culture." Drummond v.
Fulton County Department of Family & Children's Services, 547 F2d 835, 846 (1977).
3. /d. at 839.
4. /d. at 845.
5. 547 F2d at 846.
6. /d. at 846.
7. 563 F2d at 1205, quoting Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La.
1972) (three-judge court).
8. Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case
Study of Expert Discretion, 1 Research in Law & Sociology 265, 283 (1978).
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"counterrevolution ... sparked by the National Association of Black
Social Workers," 9 which vowed to "work to end this particular form of
10
genocide." "This counterrevolution cut transracial adoption by 39%
in a single year, just when the movement seemed to be growing
11
rapidly."
The critics of transracial adoption argued that the only
legitimate answer to the problem of unplaced black children was to
find black parents by, for example, having adoptions of black children
handled only by black social workers, subsidizing adoptions of black
children by black parents, and recognizing informal adoption by black
extended families.
12
Despite efforts of this kind, black children languished in the
13
limbo of foster care. In 1994, Congress passed, and in 1996 it tried to
sharpen, the Multiethnic Placement Act, which sought to keep searches
for black adoptive parents from preventing black children from being

9. /d. at 287.
10. Margaret Howard, Trans racial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard, 59 Notre Dame L Rev 503, 518 (1984).
11. Macaulay & Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children at 287-88.
12. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U Penn L Rev 1163, 1193 - 1207 (1991). Writing before
the Multiethnic Placement Act (see the next paragraph), Professor Bartholet observed,
"The matching policies of today place a high priority on expanding the pool of
prospective black adoptive parents so placements can be made without utilizing the
waiting white pool. ... [P]rograms have been created to recruit black parents, subsidies
have been provided to encourage them to adopt, and traditional parental screening
criteria have been revised." More specifically, one article written around the time
MEPA was enacted reported that
the importance attached to finding minority parents is such
that they are actively screened in, to the extent of
"canvassing bars, pool halls, speaking to ministers and
their church groups, women's clubs, and simply stopping
people in the street." ... Considerable latitude is afforded
to minority parents: a couple, for example, should not be
rejected merely because the husband or boyfriend has no
interest in adopting a child and refuses to attend any
interviews. Peter Hayes, Transracial Adoption: Politics
and Ideology, 77 Child Welfare 301, 304 (1993).
13. Professor Bartholet wrote that "some notable efforts" to recruit black adoptive
parents "have had some success in encouraging black families to consider adoption."
Bartholet at 1196. "Nonetheless, the numbers mismatch continues .... [B]oth the
number of children in foster care and the proportion that is black have been growing."
/d. at 1188. Professor Howard concluded that "[c]urrent figures are hard to locate, but
only a small number of transracial placements are still being made. Since no data
suggest that more black homes have become available, the inevitable conclusion is that
adoptable black children remain in foster homes and institutions." Howard, 59 Notre
Dame L Rev at 518. HHS reported in January 2000 that 51% of all foster children
waiting for adoption are black, 11% are Hispanic; and 32% are white. Black children
are 44% of the foster care population.
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adopted at all. 14 MEPA, however, seems to have made it scarcely
easier for white parents to adopt black children, evidently because
15
many adoption agencies implacably resist transracial adoptions, the
HHS regulations that implement MEPA leave the agencies leeway, and
16
enforcement has not been vigorous.
THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS

Who were Timmy's parents? He was legally an orphan. Should
he have been adopted by his foster parents, the Drummonds? This is
classically a question for family law. Primarily, family law resolves
disputes among individuals about how their lives in families should be
organized. But family law also referees the claims of various
collectivities to influence people's intimate lives. These collectivities
include families, ethnic and religious groups, and the broader
community as it is represented by the government. Tensions among
these collectivities are so Protean that no stable resolution of them is

14. Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-382, 551-554, 108 Stat 4056,
4056-57 (codified as amended at 42 USC 1996(b) and 42 U.S.C. 5115a (1994)).
MEPA was amended by the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996, in the
Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-188, 1808(c), 110 Stat 1755,
1904 (codified as 42 USC 1996(b)).
15. Professor Bartholet writes, "Adoption agency bureaucrats moved swiftly to
accommodate the position taken by the NABSW." She quotes Macaulay & Macaulay
at 294 - 300: "When the black social work community turned professional attitudes
around, it seemed prudent to do such things as to tum responsibility for all black
children over to black social workers and agencies. The transracial adoptive parent
organizations might be unhappy, but they were less of a threat than black power
exercised directly or through the workers' professional peers." 139 UPenn L Rev at
1181. By the time of MEPA, "strong institutional opposition to ... transracial
adoption ... has spread from the National Association of Black Social Workers ... to
child welfare agencies throughout the United States and Britain. Today, child care
professionals in both countries routinely stress the importance of race-similarity
between parents and children and discourage or prohibit TRA." Hayes, 77 Child
Welfare at 301. Similarly, Moran notes that although "many Americans, black and
white, support transracial placements, some social workers are still vehemently
opposed to them. As a result, adoption across the color line continues to be a rarity,
especially for black children who are not racially mixed." Rachel F. Moran,
Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance 128-129 (U Chicago Press,
2001).
16. Systematic evidence on this issue is hard to find, but my impressions have been
much assisted by an admirable memorandum my research assistant, Lance Rich, is
preparing for publication. While the evidence about MEPA's success is not
encouraging, there is reason to think that another recent federal statute B the Adoption
and Safe Families Act, Pub L No 105-89, 111 Stat 2115 B has evidently hastened the
adoption of foster care children. That act, among other things, gives states financial
incentives to move children out of foster care. In 1999 (the last year for which we
have figures), the number of finalized adoptions of children in foster care increased
28%. Since so many of the children available for adoption in foster care are black, and
since there is no strong reason to believe the number of black adoptive parents has
radically increased, it seems likely that transracial adoptions account for part of the
increase.
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plausible. Nevertheless, if there is a trend, it is toward favoring the
choices of individuals, toward the adage that, in America, all affinities
17
are elective.
To be sure, family law attributes special status to "the family" by,
for example, exalting "family autonomy." But that principle is at heart
a generalization about what best promotes the interests of the
individuals within the family and a presumption readily abrogated to
protect individuals from the power of families or their dominant
members. Furthermore, the primacy of the family has been eroded by
developments like no-fault divorce and a mounting willingness to
intervene in families to pursue and punish familial violence. 18 Indeed,
we have increasingly deinstitutionalized the family and ratified as a
19
family whatever relationships individuals choose to call one. So I
repeat: in America, all affinities are elective.
Family law has been even more loath to defer to the authority of
social groups than to the autonomy of families. Groups may govern
people, but only by their consent. Perhaps the greatest exception is one
20
that almost proves the rule: The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
accords tribes authority over the custody of Indian children that Indian
21
parents have tried in vain to evade.
In enacting that statute,
"Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian
children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by nonIndians."22 But ICWA is special because the group is special American law attributes to tribes kind of sovereign authority that,
however partial, no other group can boast.
But can family law's skepticism of groups' authority be squared
with its avowals of allegiance to pluralism? Yes: A pluralist regime
serves individuals by offering them an array of affinities to elect. 23
Thus family law has resisted justifying pluralism on the grounds that it
benefits the group itself. Indeed, it has doubted whether it is useful to
talk about "groups," as opposed to collections of individuals. 24 And it
17. Although the phrase beautifully fits the American case, it was originally the title
of a novel by Goethe.
18. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Family Law in the Age of Distrust, 33 Family
L Q 447 (Fall 1999); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 Michigan L Rev 1803 (1985).
19. See, for one recent example, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A2d 864 (1999). See
generally Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law:
Principles, Process, and Perspectives 1306-17 (2d ed) (West, 2001 ).
20. 25 usc§§ 1901-1963.
21. See, for example, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 US 30
(1989).
22. !d. at 49.
23. See e.g. Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, Dissent 67 (Winter
1994).
24. A good discussion of this problem is Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and
Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (U California Press, 1986).
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has feared giving power to groups - as to families - exactly because it
25
fears for the individuals within the group. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
thought the Constitution "precludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children." But is standardization more appealing when
26
enforced by the church instead of the state?
Presiding over the conflicts among individual, family, and groupand representing interests of its own - is the state. But family law
supposes that the state should stay its hand, should accommodate
individuals' preferences wherever possible, and should intervene
principally to protect the welfare of individuals. So what rules should
the state employ to govern the dispute over Timmy? How should the
claims of individual, family, group, and state be analyzed?
THE CHILD'S CLAIM

If all affinities are elective, Timmy himself should chose his
parents. But he is too young. Ordinarily, parents choose for their
children, but the very issue is who Timmy's parents are. Still, many of
the reasons we make parents trustees for their children fit the
Drummonds - they knew him best, they loved him most. For such
reasons, the Supreme Court has intimated that foster parents like the
Drummonds may have a constitutional interest in their relationship
27
with their foster children.
But even if Timmy cannot speak for himself and the Drummonds
cannot speak for him, a court could consider what he might have said.
What - to invoke the classic custody test - were his best interests? If
one truth is universally acknowledged, it is that children need parents,
need people wholly committed to them to whom they are wholly
committed. Timothy had parents in the Drummonds. Leaving them
28
would be a little Gethsemane. The Department had no black adoptive
parents in view, and the social workers thought it could take years to
find them. Even were the Drummonds mediocre parents, they might
still be better than no parents at all. But even the Department called
them exceptional parents.
Such persuasive justifications for supposing Timmy would
choose the Drummonds could only be rebutted by impressive reasons.
The Drummond court essentially accepted two. First, it thought "a
child and adoptive parents can best adjust to a normal family
relationship if the child is placed with adoptive parents who could have

25. 268 us 510 (1925).
26. "[T]hough the nation-state is less tolerant of groups, it may well force groups to
be more tolerant of individuals." Michael Walzer, On Toleration 27 (Yale U Press,
1997).
27. See Smith v. Offer, 431 US 816 (1977).
28. The literature on children's need for reliable ties with their parents and
children's pain when those ties are broken is too vast and too familiar to need citation.
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29

actually parented him."
Second, it deferred to a purported
"professional literature" and to "the accumulated experience of
unbiased professionals" and their supposed conclusion that white
parents might "not be able to cope with the [black] child's problems." 30
There was no evidence that either of these problems had troubled
Timmy and the Drummonds. But might they do so later? In fact, the
literature reaches quite a different conclusion than the court imagined.
Studies of transracial adoptions overwhelmingly find that black
children adopted by white parents do just as well on all the plausible
measures as children adopted by black parents. 31
Furthermore, the specific injuries transracial adoption is alleged
to inflict are not well demonstrated. A more specific statement of those
injuries comes from a District of Columbia "Drummoncf' -Petition of
R.M.G. 32 R.M.G's opinions feared that "the child may not perceive
33
herself as black or develop an identity as a black person" and that "the
child may experience a 'conflict of loyalties' as she grows older."34
Timmy might well be uncertain about his identity. Many children are.
Adopted children especially may be. Children of inter-racial marriages
likewise may be specially concerned about their identity. But would
Timmy's identity be any more disturbed by white parents than it
already was complicated by the circumstances of his birth and his
separation from the Drummonds?
And need struggling with his identity injure Timmy? Were that
struggle injurious, we would expect to see signs in the empirical
research, but we do not. On the contrary, there is evidence that
transracially adopted children are generally content with their racial
identities. Furthermore, mediating conflicting identities is what most
of us do. America's efflorescing cosmopolitanism grants us the gift of
35
multiple, flexible identities, and Americans increasingly believe that

29. 563 F2d at 1205-1206.
30. 563 F2d at 1205.
31. The studies as of 1991 are surveyed at some length in Elizabeth Bartholet,
Where Do Black Children Belong?: The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U
Pennsylvania L Rev 1163 (1991). The studies as of 2000 are briefly but informatively
surveyed in Rita J. Simon & Rhonda M. Roorda, In Their Own Voices: Transracial
Adoptees Tell Their Stories 13-27 (Columbia U Press, 2000).
32. 454 A2d 776 (DC App 1982).
33. /d. at 802.
34. /d..
35. See David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism 3 - 4
(Basic Books, 1995):
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life's central moral enterprise is the interminable remodeling project of
creating and revising one's identity by the choices one makes from the
givens of one's past and the possibilities of one's present. 36 On this
view, Timmy's questions about identity are not a crucifixion; they are
questions we all profit by asking.
The R.M.G. opinions also observed that a boy like Timmy might
37
face more social obloquy growing up in a white than a black family.
8
But the Supreme Court's opinion in Palmore v. SidotP seems to
preclude that argument. There the trial court had awarded custody to
the white child's white father because the court thought she would
suffer from the community's reaction to her white mother's
cohabitation with a black man. The Supreme Court acknowledged the
risk but had "little difficulty" concluding that "the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict" were constitutionally
irrelevant. And, constitutional concerns aside, some courts asked to
deny custody to parents with eccentric religious views have wondered
whether the hostility those views provoke must harm and might benefit
children. "We are not unaware that deviation from the normal often
brings ridicule and criticism. We reject, however, the notion that it is
necessarily the basis for implanting neuroses. Criticism is the crucible
39
in which character is tested."
Pluralism respects inherited boundaries and locates
individuals within one or another of a series of ethno-racial
groups to be protected and preserved. Cosmopolitanism is
more wary of traditional enclosures and favors voluntary
affiliations. Cosmopolitanism promotes multiple identities,
emphasizes the dynamic and changing character of many
groups, and is responsive to the potential for creating new
cultural combinations. Pluralism sees in cosmopolitanism
a threat to identity, while cosmopolitanism sees in
pluralism a provincial unwillingness to engage the complex
dilemmas and opportunities actually presented by
contemporary life.
36. See my criticism of courts that try to adjudicate disputes over religious
education between divorced parents of different religions in Carl E. Schneider,
Religion and Child Custody, 25 U Michigan J L Reform 879, 897- 904 (1992).
37. R.M.G., 454 A2d at 803:
When some people see a child whose race is different from
that of his parents, they assume he is an illegitimate child
or the product of a multi-racial marriage C circumstances
they may disapprove of. Other people overreact in a
well-meaning way, commenting on how wonderful it is to
adopt a minority child. But however well-intentioned, such
reactions have the effect of emphasizing to the child that he
is "different," and can lead to a sense of isolation.
38. 466 us 429 (1984).
39. Smith v. Smith, 367 P2d 230,233 (Ariz 1961). Similarly: "There may also be a
value in letting the child see, even at an early age, the religious models between which
it is likely to be led to choose in later life. And it is suggested, sometimes, that a
diversity of religious experience is itself a sound stimulant for a child." Felton v.
Felton, 418 NE2d 606,607-08 (Mass 1981).
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Another of R.M.G.'s arguments against transracial adoption is
one a social worker made to the Drummonds: that in a black home
Timmy "would be given guidance from people of the black race as to
how to protect himself and win difficult situations. It would be much
easier for a black parent to give him these skills than would a white
parent, as they would be teaching him from their own experience."40
Perhaps. But consider the testimony of Kim Forde-Mazrui, who is the
son of a black father and a white mother and the adoptive father of a
white child. He criticizes the "coping skills" argument because it
falsely "assumes that a person must experience racism first hand ... to
41
teach a child how to cope with it." He asks, "Must a parent have
worn glasses, been fat, worn braces, or been short in order to help her
child who, while on the playground, is called 'four eyes,' 'fatso,'
42
'tinsel teeth,' or 'shrimp' ?"
In addition, Professor Forde-Mazrui
thinks black children of white parents may acquire some "coping"
43
advantages, such as a greater ease in dealing with white people.
All the harms we have canvassed could occur. But they are
speculations, speculations about problems likeliest to occur, if they
occur at all, years into the future. They are thus kinds of harm childcustody law has increasingly distrusted. That law now emphasizes the
quality of the relationship between the child and would-be custodians.
Furthermore, the harms we have canvassed are only a few of the many
factors that will affect that relationship, Timmy's happiness as a child,
and his worth as a man. Not least, the Drummonds had it right when
they told a social worker that "they felt that the most important thing
Timmy needed to be secure and happy about himself, was to have
parents who truly loved him." And all the evidence unites to proclaim
that Timmy's relationship with the Drummonds was exemplary.
And that leads us to a last and crucial consideration: The issue is
not whether the Drummonds might be imperfect, for all custodians are;
it is which custodian will serve him best. The realistic alternative to
adoption by white parents for Timmy and many black children is
languishing in a foster-care system that is a woeful alternative even to
mediocre parents. And, most ironically, foster parents are likely to be
white. For the foreseeable future, then, Timmy's choice is between life
as an orphan and life with the only parents he had ever known, the
parents who loved him, the parents he loved. Was this a choice?

40. 547 F2d at 844. To like effect, see R.M.G., 454 A2d at 802 - 03, and .
NABSW's Position on Trans-Racial Adoption, 5 National Association of Black Social
Workers Journal 9 (Summer 1973).
41. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of
Black and Biracial Children, 92 Michigan L Rev 925, 953 (February 1994). I am
proud to say that Professor Forde-Mazrui was once my research assistant.
42. /d. at 954.
43. /d. at 951.
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THE ETHNIC CLAIM

I have just argued that if we heed the principle that all affinities
are elective by making for Timmy the choice he would make for
himself, we would confide him to the care and comfort of the
Drummonds. But did his race have an interest in his being raised by
members of that race? The most influential sentence ever written
44
about transracial adoption reviled it as genocide.
The National
Association of Black Social Workers's accusation rested partly on "the
philosophy that we need our own to build a strong nation." 45 The
NABSW's president asserted in 1985 that it was protecting "the rights
of Black children, Black families, and the Black community. We view
the placement of Black children in white homes as a hostile act against
our community. It is a blatant form of race and cultural genocide."46
Generally, groups' interests in their children are recognized by
honoring parents' preferences. For example, children ordinarily take
the religion their parents assign them - cujus regio, ejus religio - and
parents ordinarily assign children their own religion. Even Wisconsin
7
v. Yode/ is not to the contrary. There the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a statute that required Amish children to attend ninth
and tenth grades. The opinion famously celebrates the virtues of the
Amish and denounces the statute's menace to their life, their religion,
and their community. However, Yoder's facts and reasoning are less
consoling than its language to any argument that a group has a claim to
its children that is independent of their parents' claim. Mr. Yoder was
a parent, and the parents and the community were as one. In addition,
the Court independently examined whether the children would be
injured by their parents' and their community's arguments and
concluded that they would not be.
But let us take seriously Yoder's rhapsodic language about the
Amish community's interests in their children. Are the interests of
Timmy's race in his choice of parents then legally cognizable? This
question provokes another: What is Timmy's race? If all affinities are
elective, only Timmy can say. But here we might imagine two
exceptions to the elective-affinities principle. First, if race is a
"natural" category, if "science" identifies human characteristics that
reliably define "race," we might freely assign children to races. But
who today believes this? "Biologists, geneticists, and physical
anthropologists, among others, long ago reached a common
understanding that race is not a "scientific" concept rooted in
44. Quoted in Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best
Interests Standard, 59 Notre Dame L Rev 503, 518 (1984).
45. Quoted/d. at517.
46. Quoted in R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents'
Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 Yale L J 875,919 n 190
(1998).
47. 406 us 205 (1972).
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48

discernible biological differences. "
Second, assigning children to races might be legitimate if races
are social categories about whose membership there is a stable
consensus. However, there has been no such consensus historically or
today. Races have changed unsettlingly over time and remain
unsettled. For example, Jews were once considered a race, and "Asian"
comprehends many peoples who do not cheerfully group themselves
49
together.
But has not a widely accepted understanding of "black" evolvedthe "one-drop" rule which essentially calls "black" anyone with any
50
"black" ancestor, however remote? That rule captures the way many,
perhaps most, Americans define "black," but it must also evoke
51
unease, since its Jim Crow origins and Niirnberg parallels are
palpable and odious. In any event, should that rule override the
elective-affinities principle? While many people who fit the definition
embrace it, not all do. Some pass for white. Some people who call
52
themselves Indian or Hispanic have black ancestors.
"Many firstgeneration Black immigrants ... distance themselves from, subscribe
to negative stereotypes of, and believe that, as ethnic immigrants, they
53
are accorded a higher status than, Black Americans." Perhaps most
significantly, interracial marriages are multiplying, although they

48. Michael A. Omi, The Changing Meaning of Race, in Neil J. Smelser, William
Julius Wilson, & Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their
Consequences 243 (National Academy Press, 2001). For example, "In 1997 the
American Anthropological Association counseled the federal government to phase out
use of the term 'race' in the collection of data because the concept has no scientific
justification in human biology." !d. at 254.
49. Even subracial groupings can provoke disagreement: "Many Americans from
Central America think of themselves as 'mestizo,' a term that refers to a mixture of
Central American Indian and European ancestry. Among those surveyed in the
National Latino Political Survey in 1989, the greatest number of respondents chose to
be labeled by their country of origin, as opposed to 'pan-ethnic' terms such as
'Hispanic' or 'Latino."' Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 20 (Princeton U
Press, 2001).
50. F. James Davis, Who Is Black?: One Nation's Definition (U Pennsylvania Press,
1991).
51. !d. at 15.
52. "Large numbers of Hispanics with some black ancestry have succeeded in
defining themselves as Hispanics or Latinos." /d. at 158. "[A] great many people
classed as Indians have some black background." !d. at 21.
53. Michael A. Omi, The Changing Meaning of Race, in Neil J. Smelser, William
Julius Wilson, & Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their
Consequences 246 (National Academy Press, 2001). Professor Omi continues,
"Children of Black immigrants, who lack their parents' distinctive accents, have more
choice in assuming different identities. Some try to defy racial classification as 'Black
Americans' by strategically asserting their ethnic identity in specific encounters with
Whites. Others simply see themselves as 'Americans."' Nor are people who meet the
one-drop test necessarily welcomed as black by blacks. "Some groups, such as Black
Cubans in Miami, encounter marginalization from both Black and Hispanic American
communities." !d. at 249.
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remain unusual between blacks and whites. 54 These marriages
significantly produce children who are likely - ever more likely - to
regard themselves as something other than a member of either race
simpliciter.
In short, even race can be an elective affinity. As Moran notes,
"people readily shift their identities in response to changing policy,
such as
preferential treatment under affirmative action
programs .... [F]rom 1950 to 1990, the Native American population in
55
the United States grew over fivefold from 377,000 to 1.96 million."
More significantly for our purposes, a growing number of Americans
explicitly call themselves biracial and insist on their right to designate
56
themselves that way. They passionately contend that they draw from
7
multiple heritages and are entitled to have all of them acknowledged. 5
This makes it yet more perilous to assign people to races. It
specifically makes it hard to assign Timmy to a race, for, while we
have perhaps been assuming he is black, his mother was white and his
father was black. Indeed, in the likely course of things, Timmy would
have lived only with his mother and thus grown up in a white
household.
In sum, it is harder to assign children a race than one might think,
and we might well flinch from deciding, for example, the race of the
54. "Between a quarter and a third of all marriages involving Japanese Americans
are now out-group marriages. More indigenous people marry outside the Indigenous
bloc than marry within it. Even marriages between African Americans and whites,
prohibited in some States as late as the 1960s, have increased by 300 percent since
1970." David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism 41 B 42
(Basic Books, 1995).
55. Rachel F. Moran, Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance
108 (U Chicago Press, 2001). One striking confirmation of this proposition comes
from
the growing body of evidence indicating that ethnic and racial
identities are far more sensitive to method of data collection
than a simple biological model would suggest. Reinterview
studies, for example, have demonstrated that respondentreported race and interviewer-reported race are not always
other
research
has
also
consistent .... Similarly,
demonstrated that self-reports are not always consistent with
either self or proxy reports at reinterview . . . , and that
responses to self-administered and interviewer-administered
questionnaires are inconsistent as well. Timothy P. Johnson et
al, Dimensions of Self Identification Among Multiracial and
Multiethnic Respondents in Survey Interviews, at
<http://www .census.gov/prod/2/gen/96arc/iiiajohn.pdf> pg. 7.
56. For example, 5.4% of the population classified itself as "others" in the 2000
census, up from 4% in 1990. Amitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 26 (Princeton
U Press, 2001).
57. In one study, "multiracial respondents largely prefer[red] a question format that
permits them to self-identify themselves as 'multiracial.' Many, in fact, expressed
negative emotional reactions to their common experience of forced categorization into
a single racial group or relegation to a residual 'Other-specify' category." Timothy P.
Johnson et al at 7 B 8.
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child of a Jewish father and a mother who "is of Black, American
Indian and Irish heritage." 58 But the problem is not just assigning a
race to the child; it is also attributing opinions to the race. Who speaks
for any race in the way representatives of Amish communities speak
for them? Amish communities are homogeneous and structured, and
they maintain orthodoxy through disciplined resistance to the
pluralizing influence of the world and by splitting into separate
communities when divided by doctrinal disputes. In contrast, blacks
are an eighth of the American population, geographically dispersed,
and socially and culturally heterogeneous.
Most significantly, polls indicate that a substantial majority of
59
black people oppose restrictions on transracial adoption.
For
example, in 1991 seventy-one percent of black Americans supported
transracial adoption.ffl They may, for instance, feel that their race's
interests regarding Timmy would not be best served by severing him
from the only parents he ever knew, parents with whom he flourished,
and expelling him into a world of strangers.
Let me put the point differently. At a conference I once cited the
views on transracial adoption of one black academic. Another black
academic angrily insisted that the first was not a "real" black and that
his opinions therefore had to be ignored B even scorned B in favor of
her authentic views. Were the government to defer to "the group" in
choosing parents for Timmy it would have to decide what position a
"genuinely" black person would take. It is hardly clear that races have
orthodoxies or that we should want them to. In any event, no court is
well situated to ascertain any race's orthodoxy, and since ascertaining
61
orthodoxy inevitably influences it, we should not want a court to try.

58. Tubwon v. Weisberg, 394 NW2d 601,604 (Minn App 1986).
59. Many blacks reject the views of the NABSW in other respects. For example,
"48% of blacks and 47% of whites agreed that the Census Bureau should stop
collecting information on race and ethnicity 'in an effort to move toward a more colorblind society C even if it becomes more difficult to measure progress on civil rights
and poverty programs."' Arnitai Etzioni, The Monochrome Society 14 (Princeton U
Press, 2001).
60. Rita J. Simon, Transracial Adoptions: In the Children's Best Interests, Black
Issues in Higher Education, May 4, 1995, reprinted in Congressional Record, Senate,
104th Cong 1st Session, 141 Cong Rec S 12624 (Sept 5, 1995).
61. Compare the cases in which courts confronted with disputes over church
property decline to decide which groups represent the authoritative view of the
religion's dogma. See Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody 25 Michigan J L
Reform 879, 888-889 (1992). Cf Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the
Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U Michigan J L Reform 751, 787 B 788 (1992): [T]here
is something artificial about a commitment to preserve minority cultures. Cultures live
and grow, change and sometimes wither away; they amalgamate with other cultures, or
they adapt themselves to geographical or demographic necessity. To preserve a culture
is often to take a favored 'snapshot' version of it, and insist that this version must
persist at all costs .... "
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THE CLAIMS OF THE COMMUNITY

The task of the community (as it is represented by the
government) is twofold: first, to nurture and mediate the claims of the
individual, the family, and the group, second, to cherish those claims
that promote the kind of society we aspire to. As to the competing
claims, I have argued that Timmy would have chosen the Drummonds;
that though Drummonds' legal position is tenuous, since they began as
contractual foster parents, they are truly in loco parentis and ache to
adopt Timmy; and that government has no place to look for an
authoritative statement of how any race's interests would best be
served. On this view, the conflicting claims should be resolved by a
decision for the Drummonds.
This leaves us with the second issue: What rule for children like
Timmy would best foster the society we want? To answer this
question, let us ask another: Why did transracial adoption, which not
long ago was blossoming, which seemed to succor the needs of many
black children and assuage the wants of many white adults, wither
when attacked? Reasons abound. For example, racial matching fits
adoption agencies' longstanding preference for matching of all kinds.
And it fits the politics of diametrically opposed groups. The
NABSW's hostility to transracial adoption eerily echoes the Jim Crow
of the past and finds untoward allies in the racism of the present. Who
said: "These unfortunate girls ... will have a much better opportunity
to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their
62
own people"? And who said: "We affirm the invioable [sic] position
of Black children in Black families where they belong physically,
psychologically and culturally in order that they receive the total sense
of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future"? 63
In addition, a broader cultural development gives resonance to
criticisms of transracial adoption. Americans increasingly think people
cannot understand each other and thus are doomed to be strangers one
to another. Several versions of this view enjoy cultural currency.
First, many disciplines make opacity plausible. Freud convinced us
that people are propelled by unconscious and non-rational drives so
primal and painful that people do not perceive and cannot acknowledge
them. If people mystify themselves, how can they understand each
other? Psychology and sociology have convinced us that people are
shaped by biological and social forces whose influence is indirect but
inescapable - genes, parental attitudes, child-rearing practices, family
status, education, and so on. If we cannot know what has formed our
neighbors, we cannot understand them. And people are not just
62. This remark is from the court in Ward v. Ward, 216 P2d 755, 756 (Wash 1950),
explaining its decision to award custody of children of an interracial .;ouple to the
black father.
63. NABSW's Position on Trans-Racial Adoption, 5 National Association of Black
Social Workers Journal 9, 9 (Summer 1973).
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molded from without, they define themselves. This private and
dynamic process also makes people inscrutable to each other.
More specifically, it is a triumphing cliche that people who have
not shared experiences cannot understand each other. Hence the
proliferation of support groups, which unite people with shared
experiences narrowly defined, like teenage children of alcoholic
parents. Many people who join these groups expect true understanding
64
The work of providing
and communion only from doppelgangers.
intelligent sympathy once performed by generalists- friends, family, or
clergy - now requires experts taught by specific experience (yet another
example of the division of labor in society).
The sense that men and women can never understand each other,
perhaps always lively, has effervesced in recent decades. It has long
been folk wisdom - and folk humor - that men and women think and
act differently; today it is a leitmotif of best seller lists: e.g., Men Are
From Mars, Women Are From Venus. That idea has acquired
academic dignity. For example, Carol Gilligan argues that men and
women approach moral reasoning differently, and John Townsend
contends that evolution has led men and women to seek crucially
different things. 65 These differences are magnified by a careless slide
from the observation that as groups men and women differ statistically
to the assumption that every man differs tout court from every woman.
If individuals are mutually incomprehensible, how much more so
must be groups. On this view, America comprises cultural groups particularly ethnic groups -that differ monumentally, whose members
are primarily defined by their membership, and whose members thus
differ irreconcilably from each other. They think differently, act
differently, are different. These differences arise from diverging
cultural traditions and varying ways society treats groups. For
example, "[t]here is now a virtually unchallenged presumption that,
looking at the issue of race, blacks and whites see altogether different
realities." 66 Thus we are often instructed that black and white
Americans not only understand a common language differently, but
speak different languages that use different words and different
grammar. And thus it was routinely said blacks and whites had had
such different encounters with the police that they saw the evidence
about OJ. Simpson in hopelessly conflicting ways that could never be
64. For example: "All the other chronically ill people on the waiting list can't be
wrong either. Only they and I really know how Irv can help us. It is something so
private, inside yourself .... " Ellen Burstein MacFarlane with Patricia Burstein,
Legwork: An Inspiring Journey Through a Chronic Illness 134 (Scribner's, 1994). Irv,
as her family saw and Burstein later recognized, was a charlatan offering false hopes
for high fees.
65. What Women Want- What Men Want: Why The Sexes Still See Love &
Commitment So Differently (Oxford U Press, 1998).
66. Paul M. Sniderman & Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race 135
(Harvard U Press, 1997).
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reconciled by reasoned argument. On a strong view of these
perceptions, groups not only cannot understand each other, but an
attempt to do so is an act of aggression, an attempt to arrogate the
power to define a group instead of allowing it to define itself.
No one doubts that people differ, that we regularly surprise even
ourselves and certainly each other. But our mutual incomprehensibility
is lethally exaggerated. Even blacks and whites see many contentious
issues similarly. Thus one of the most meticulous studies of its subject
insists that, "to an extent which deserves to be appreciated again, black
Americans and white Americans share the same culture."67 More, "[i]t
was emphatically not the case that blacks saw one reality of race, and
whites another, with blacks fixing the blame for blacks being worse off
on whites and whites pointing the finger at blacks. On the contrary,
most cited the same factors, and to approximately the same degree." 68
In short, the differences among us are real, but they are not the
whole story. Our similarities are numerous and strong enough to make
possible a society of mutual concern, a society which recognizes the
elements of common humanity that bind and oblige us to each other.
That is the kind of society the civil rights movement in its earliest and
in some ways most radical incarnation marvelously and movingly
invoked. And that I believe is the kind of society the community,
acting through the government, should wish to promote in cases like
Drummond. And that is the kind of society the Drummond court, with
its fixation on what might separate Timmy from his parents and its
indifference to what might unite them, implicitly depreciated and
deplorably discouraged.
I opened with the parable of Drummond. Recall another parable.
We are told that "the Jews ha[d] no dealings with the Samaritans," that
a Jew "went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves,
which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed,
leaving him half dead," that a priest and a Levite "passed by on the
other side, . . . [b ]ut a certain Samaritan ... had compassion on him,
[a]nd went to him, and bound up his wounds .... " We are rhetorically
asked, "Which now of these three ... was neighbour unto him that fell
among the thieves?"
CONCLUSION

I have told two stories, both remarkable. The first is the story of
transracial adoption. Not long ago, it seemed a modest but well
founded solution to the needs of minority children without parents and
the wants of couples without children. The evidence that white parents
must fail black children is hardly more than bare assertion, while the
evidence that transracially adopted children grow up as happily as
67. ld. at 138.
68. ld. at 135.
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other adopted children is substantial. Certainly such children are better
off than if left to the mercies of foster care. A majority of black
Americans opposes bans of transracial adoption. And those bans (now
tacit and even illegal, but apparently still effective) are ever more
anachronistic in an era of mutiplying interracial marriage. And yet
transracial adoption is resisted.
The second remarkable story is Timmy Drummond's. I will tell
you what I know of its end. In May 1976, during the litigation and
when Timmy was about two and a half, the Department apparently
took Timmy from the Drummonds and placed him with a couple of
"mixed racial ancestry." This placement seems to have failed, and the
last we hear is that Timmy was eventually put in yet another foster
home with a "mixed race couple" who thought they wanted to adopt
69
him.
The parable of Robert and Mildred Drummond and their son
Timmy is the story of people who needed each other and who came to
love each other. They understood each other well enough to live
together as happily as is usually given to human beings. The
Drummonds and Timmys of this world can be taught to regard
themselves as irredeemably strangers. They cannot afford to. More
broadly, it need not take the lessons of the last century, or of the last
year, to remind us of our need for each other or our capacity for
endless enmity. When I open the copy of Why We Can't Wait I bought
in high school, I find underlined this closing passage from the Letter
from Binningham Jail with which I will close today: "Let us all hope
that the dark clouds of racial prejudice will soon pass away and the
deep fog of misunderstanding will be lifted from our fear-drenched
communities, and in some not too distant tomorrow the radiant stars of
love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation with all their
cintillating beauty."

69. Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A Plea for Realistic Constitutional Decisionmaking,
11 Columbia Human Rights L Rev 1, 7 (1979).

